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The Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

The psychiatrist-patient privilege' has been legally recognized in
Illinois for more than twenty-five years. Initially arising by court
sanction,2 this privileged relationship 'received legislative endorsement in 1963.1 Recognizing both the expanding role of psychiatry in
1. The psychiatrist-patient privilege is an evidentiary rule which permits the patient to
prevent disclosure of communications made to a psychiatrist in a professional setting.
2. Binder v. Ruvell, Civ. Docket No. 52-3-2535, (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. 1952), cited
in full in 150 J.A.M.A. 1241 (1952).
3. Evidence Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (originally enacted in July, 1963,
repealed 1978 by Pub. Act. No. 80-1508, 1978 I11.Legis. Serv. 1510 (West), to be codified at
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 ,12, § 801 et seq.).
As repealed, 5.2 provided:
5.2 Psychiatrist-patient relationship
In civil and criminal cases, in proceedings preliminary thereto, and in legislative
and administrative proceedings, a patient or his authorized representative and a
psychiatrist or his authorized representative have the privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent a witness from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or
treatment of the patient's mental condition between patient and psychiatrist, or
between members of the patient's family and the psychiatrist, or between any of
the foregoing and such persons under the supervision of a psychiatrist in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis or treatment.
There is no privilege under this Section for any relevant communications.
(a) when a psychiatrist, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient,
determines that the patient is in need of hospitalization, provided that such communications shall be admissible only with respect to issues relating to the need for
such hospitalization;
(b) if the judge finds that the patient, after having been informed that the
communications would not be privileged, has made communications to a psychiatrist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court, provided that
such communications shall be admissible only with respect to issues involving the
patient's mental condition;
(c) in a civil or administrative proceeding in which the patient introduced his
mental condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the patient's death,
when his mental condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending
through or as a beneficiary of the patient; the provisions of this paragraph (c) shall
not apply to preclude the assertion of the privilege in any action brought or defended under the "Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act," as now or
hereafter amended, unless the patient or the psychiatrist on behalf of the patient
first testifies as to such communications;
(d) in any proceeding brought by the patient against his psychiatrist, including
but not limited to any malpractice proceeding, and in any criminal or license
revocation proceeding in which the patient is a complaining witness and in which
disclosure is relevant to the claim or defense of the psychiatrist.
As used in this Section, "patient" means a person who for the purpose of securing
diagnosis or treatment of his mental condition consults a psychiatrist;
"psychiatrist" means a person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his time to the practice of psychiatry, or a person reasonably believed
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contemporary society and the public interest inherent in the matter,
the general assembly molded an inclusive statute to administer the
privilege. 4 In an effort to provide a broader, more comprehensive
privilege, the Illinois legislature recently repealed the existing statute and replaced it with a privilege encompassing the psychiatrist,
psychologist, social worker, nurse, and others providing similar services.' The new enactment, effective January 1, 1979, is entitled the
"Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality
Act." 6
This article will examine the impact of the new statute on the
previous state of the law with primary focus on the current status
of the Illinois psychiatrist-patient privilege. Emphasis will be directed at pre-existing ambiguities resolved by the Act and at those
which remain unattended. Finally, this article will conclude with an
analysis of the legislature's innovative approach to matters never
considered under the prior psychiatrist-patient privilege.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVILEGE

Before the early 1800's, the only professional privilege recognized
in American common law was that granted to attorney-client communications.7 Physicians could not refuse to testify, and a
psychiatrist-patient privilege was beyond consideration, as the field
of psychiatry was virtually unknown to the public. New York enacted the first statute granting a physician-patient privilege in
1928,1 and numerous states then followed suit. The psychiatrist was
included within the physician-patient privilege, because psychiatrists were considered nothing more than specialized medical practitioners. Despite this multi-jurisdictional trend, there was disagreement among commentators regarding the privilege.
by the patient to be so qualified; "authorized representative" means a person
empowered by the patient or the psychiatrist to assert the privilege and, when given
permission by the patient or the psychiatrist, to make disclosure of communications
made privileged by this Section.
4. Evidence Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
5. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1510 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 912, § 801 et
seq.) [hereinafter cited in text as the Act].
6. Id.§1.
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 at 527 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMOREI;I; Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial
Privilege, 47 Nw.U.L. REV. 384, 385 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Confidential
Communications].
8. II N.Y. REv. STATS. pt. III, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73 (1829), reprinted in Louisell &
Sinclair, Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications, 59 CAL. L. REv. 30, 32 n.9
(1971) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & SINCLAIR].
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Wigmore believed that a separate physician-patient privilege was
not justified. He based this conclusion on his proposed framework
for determining whether a common law privilege should be extended. He suggested that any privilege against disclosure of a particular communication must satisfy all of the following fundamental
conditions: (1) the communication must originate in the confidence
that it will not be disclosed; (2) the element of confidentiality must
be essential to the effective integrity of the relationship between the
parties; (3) the relationship must be one which in the opinion of the
commmunity deserves sedulity; and (4) the injury inuring to the
relationship by the disclosure of the communication must be greater
than the benefit gained from the correct disposal of the litigation?
Wigmore concluded that his four canons did not justify the
physician-patient privilege.' 0 This finding was echoed by other legal
scholars." Wigmore believed that the only support for extending
relathis privilege, the concern with fostering the physician-patient
2
tionship, was not alone sufficient to justify the privilege.
Despite Wigmore's objections to the physician-patient privilege,
several commentators submit that the psychiatrist-patient relationship satisfies all of Wigmore's imperatives. 13 Subsequent legislative
action has been prompted by an increased appreciation of the critical need for confidentiality in a psychiatrist-patient relationship. 4
Numerous states have enacted legislation granting a specific privilege to the communications between a patient and his psychiatrist. 5
9. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2285. The four conditions have been cited and quoted extensively in legal writings and judicial decisions. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American
Gas Assn., 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963); Morris v. Avallone, 272 A.2d 344 (Del. Super. Ct.
1970); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV.
175, 179 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLOVENKO[; Confidential Communications, supra note
7, at 386.
10. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2380a at 831.
11. See, e.g., SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 180; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is
Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE
L.J. 607 (1943); Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of Privileges, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 1287,1324 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Federal Rules]; E. CLEARY et al., MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 105 at 228 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK (2d ed.)1.
12. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2380a at 829.
13. See LOUISELL & SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 52; SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 184;
Confidential Communications, supra note 7, at 387.
14. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (repealed 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-146d (West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.215 (1972);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-504 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-112 (Supp. 1977); see also
CAL. EVID. COE § 1010 et seq. (West 1966) (psychotherapist privilege encompassing psychiatrist); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West Supp. 1978) (psychotherapist privilege); ME. R. EvID.
503 (West Supp. 1978) (psychotherapist).
15. See note 14 supra.
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These statutes were often far from precise. Prior to the passage of
the Act, the Illinois statute was typical in its failure to produce
specific and definitive illustrations Of the exact scope of the
psychiatrist-patient privilege. Under the repealed statute," it was
not apparent whether the privilege barred disclosure of the mere
fact of psychiatric consultation. 7 No guidelines existed regarding
disclosure in the event of an imminent threat of criminal conduct.
The standing of the psychiatrist to prevent disclosure contrary to
the express wish of the patient had remained an unattended question. Finally, the distinction between unprivileged observations and
privileged communications continued unaddressed by the legislature. 8 The Act has explicitly resolved the uncertainty inherent in
the first three of these areas and by reasonable interpretation should
adequately diminish any confusion caused by the fourth.
RATIONALE: THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY

The primary rationale for recognizing the psychiatrist-patient
privilege is to protect the confidentiality of this communication.
Absent protection of such intimate communications, persons in
need would forsake treatment." Moreover, the effectiveness of existing treatment would suffer. The patient must feel secure, knowing
that his disclosures will remain private, before he can escape his
inhibitions and reveal his most guarded thoughts."' The need to
protect the patient's freedom to speak openly and honestly cannot
be exaggerated; it is the foundation of successful psychiatric treatment. 2 ' The psychiatrist's employment of the free-association
16. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
17. SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 188; Note, Psychiatrist's Duty to the Public: Protection
from Dangerous Patients, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1103, 1113 [hereinafter cited as PSYCHIATRIST'S
DUTYl. Both commentators would bar disclosure of the mere fact of having the privileged
communication. Contra, WIGMORE, supra note 7, at 846; Confidential Communication. supra
note 7, at 387; Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 557, 173 N.E.2d 122 (1961)
(physician not prevented from testifying that he was consulted on a certain date).
18. The court in In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 175-76, 362 N.E.2d 1153, 1155-56
(1977) considered this distinction, but did not definitively resolve the matter.
19. Cf. Psychiatrist'sDuty, supra note 17, at 1112.
20. SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 185; LoUISELL & SINCLIaR, supra note 8, at 52; Goldstein
& Katz, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege: The GAP Prposaland the Connecticut Statute. 36
CONN. B.J. 175,179 (1962) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN & KATZI; Sloan & Klein,
Psychotherapeutic Disclosures:A Conflict Between Right and Duty, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 57, 65
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SLoA & KLEIN]; Note, The DangerousPatient Exception and
the Duty to Warn: Creation of a Dangerous Precedent?, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 549, 555 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as DangerousPatient].
21. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Defendant was permitted
to raise psychiatrist-patient privilege and thus bar the testimony of a hospital psychiatrist.
The defendant had admitted to the psychiatrist that he had earlier feigned the schizophrenic
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method requires the patient to express everything which comes to
mind, as inappropriate or absurd as it may seem.2 2 The patient's
thoughts must be allowed to wander without restraint, so that the
psychiatrist can elicit an accurate picture of the patient's thought
23
processes.
The psychiatric patient's vulnerable condition must also be considered in determining the need for privileged communications.
Psychiatric treatment often occasions social stigma,2 4 a particularly
unfortunate circumstance, as it manifests a hyperbolized effect
upon its sensitive recipients.2 5 Thus, the patient must be assured
that his guarded revelations will be protected with the utmost care.
He may be ridiculed for merely undergoing treatment, and should
not be further burdened with the likelihood of disclosure.
THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE

The Forums Affected and Sanctions
In language virtually identical to the repealed psychiatristpatient privilege, the Act authorizes the application of the privilege
"in any civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or
in any proceeding preliminary thereto. '2 The statute specifies only
symptoms in order to be diagnosed incompetent to stand trial. Judge Edgerton, writing for
the court, concisely states the need for trust and confidence in psychiatric treatment:
In regard to mental patients, the policy behind such a statute is particularly clear
and strong. Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but a psychiatrist must have his
patient's confidence or he cannot help him.
Id. at 401.
22. SLOVENKO, supra note 9, at 186; LouiSELL & SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 52. Cf. Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 660, 670 (1965)
(free disclosure is a sine qua non to effective psychiatric treatment).
23. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry expressed this need to protect the
confidentiality of the psychiatrist-patient relationship:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality.
His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness
and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. . . .Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their
patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in order to
do this, it must be possible to communicate freely.
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 92 (Report No. 45, 1960), reprinted in Advisory
Committee Note to Court Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972).
24. Psychiatrist'sDuty, supra note 17, at 1112; LouisELL & SINCLAIR, supra note 8, at 52.
25. Psychiatrist'sDuty, supra note 17, at 1112-1113; GoLDsTEIN & KATZ, supra note 20,
at 178.
26. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 10(a), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West)(to be codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2,
§ 801 § 10(a)).
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a limited number of forums in which the privilege operates.17 The
privilege is not intended to prevent unwarranted disclosure by the
psychiatrist to third parties during informal conversations. ' , It focuses entirely on testimonial disclosure.2
A psychiatrist's violation of the patient's confidence, under the
past psychiatrist-patient privilege, might in the exceptional case
merit an action for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy. :", In direct
contrast to the absence of sanctions under the repealed statute, the
Act explicitly grants the aggrieved person an action for damages,
injunction, or other appropriate relief.3' The Act further permits the
court to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to the successful
plaintiff, which should serve as a self-policing mechanism .' To further ensure compliance with the Act, a criminal sanction has been
incorporated which makes any knowing and willful violation of any
provision of the Act a Class A misdemeanor." The repealed privilege
statute omitted criminal and civil sanctions, and apparently the
availability of comprehensive remedies reflects the legislature's concern regarding violations of the Act.
27. In this respect it is unlike several other privilege statutes. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 51, § 5.1 (1977), as amended by Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1508, 1978 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 1510 (West)(physician-patient
privilege); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 6324 (1977), as amended by Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1508, 1978 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 1510
(West)(social worker privilege) (to be codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91., § 801 et seq.).
28. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 10, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified at Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 V, § 801
et seq.).
29. The patient is not, however, without some protection from unwarranted disclosure in
non-judicial settings. Psychiatry, like most professions, sets a requisite standard of conduct
to be maintained by all members. This standard is embodied in the Psychiatrist's Code of
Ethics, which prohibits the professional from revealing confidences entrusted to him during
medical treatment. The only exceptions are legal compulsion and circumstances such as
disclosure neccessary to protect the welfare of the patient or the community. AMA, PINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957), reprinted in Dangerous Patient, supra note 20, at 555.
30. See Herbert, Does the Law Seal the Doctor's Mouth?, 52 J. MicH. ST. MED. SOC'Y 385
(1953); SLOA & KLEIN, supra note 20, at 61 n.15. But cf. LoUIsELL & SINCLAIR, supra note 8,
at 33 (a successful suit, brought under the causes of action mentioned in the text, is rare).
31. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 15, 1978 11. Legis. Serv. 1516 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,§
801 et seq.). The Act is unclear whether § 15 operates to preclude a common law action for
libel, slander, or invasion of privacy by a person aggrieved by a violation of the Act. Certainly
such a restrictive construction is not mandated. The matter may be purely academic, however, because the statutorily-created cause of action under § 15 of the Act is undoubtedly
the most convenient avenue to pursue.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 16.
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Subject Matter
The Act contains an ambiguity which existed in the original
psychiatrist-patient privilege, although it may now be of diminished
significance. The previous and current privileges are restricted to
communications between the psychiatrist and his patient, and each
implicitly excludes the psychiatrist's observations from its coverage. 4 A narrow construction of communication, as it is used in
section 2(1) of the Act,3 5 would only include verbal exchanges between the psychiatrist and patient while permitting disclosure of all
nonverbal" communications. A broader interpretation would encompass both verbal and nonverbal communications. If particular
information is adjudged to be observation rather than communication, the construction placed on "communication" would be decisive. The most imposing factor in the decision whether to apply a
strict or broad construction to "communication" must be an attempt to effectuate the legislature's purpose and spirit in enacting
the Act. A reference to the preamble of the Act reveals a legislative
intent "to protect the confidentiality of records and communications of recipients of mental health or developmental disability services." The only judicial construction with reflects the underlying
purpose of the Act is the broader interpretation of "communication," encompassing verbal and nonverbal exchanges.
While the previous statute apparently overlooked the dichotomy
between observation and communication, the Act may have tacitly
addressed the issue. Section 3(b) of the Act :7 permits the psychiatrist to keep personal notes which are not subject to discovery in any
judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding. :"' Personal notes
are defined to include "the therapist's speculations, impressions,
hunches, and reminders ' 39 which may approximate a definition of
"observation." ' 0 The Act allows the psychiatrist to take written
notes of nonverbal information and grants these notes even greater
immunity from disclosure than portions of verbal communications.
34. Id. § 2(1); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977)(repealed 1978).
35. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No.
80-1508, § 2(1), 1978 I1. Legis. Serv. 1510 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 911/2,
§ 801 et seq.).
36. Nonverbal communications would include the patient's conduct, gestures, and mannerisms. See In re Westland, 48 Ill. App. 3d 172, 362 N.E.2d 1153 (1977).
37. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 3(b), 1978 I1. Legis. Serv. 1511 (West).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 2(4)(iii).
40. Id. § 3(a).
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Privileged verbal communication remains subject to the many exceptions enumerated in the Act,4 while the personal notes are not
2
subject to discovery in any legal or administrative proceeding.
Unlike the preferential treatment given to personal notes, the
recipient's records kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course
of providing mental health services 3 are confidential but subject to
the numerous exceptions provided in the Act.4" The previous
psychiatrist-patient privilege, section 5.2, had endeavored to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the privileged communications
but the statute was silent concerning the confidentiality of the official records. Implicitly, however, the psychiatrist's records were
subject to the identical provisions for confidentiality and waiver
incorporated in the repealed psychiatrist-patient privilege.45 The
Act emphasizes the inclusion of this additional element, the confidentiality of records, which will serve to alleviate the uncertainty
existing under the previous statute.
The Illinois legislature has clarified an issue which had been neglected under the prior statute. Confidential communication, according to section 2(1) of the Act,46 includes information which indicates
a person's status as a psychiatric patient. Prior to the Act, the courts
and commentators had debated the propriety of treating this information as confidential, but neither side had emerged with a majority.47 By extending confidentiality to include the mere fact of treatment and the patient's name, the legislature has demonstrated an
awareness of the stigma attached to psychiatric treatment and the
potential vulnerability of those seeking therapy.
Individuals Protected
The repealed statute" extended the umbrella of confidentiality to
encompass conversations with the patient's family members in furtherance of the patient's diagnosis or treatment. Evidently, this
41. Section 2(7) of the Act states that the personal notes shall be considered part of the
patient's record if the therapist does not keep sole possession of the notes or if they are
disclosed to someone other than the therapist's supervisor, consulting therapist or attorney.
Id.§ 2(7).
42. Id. § 3(b).
43. Id. § 2(7).
44. Id. § 3.
45. See, e.g., Gottemoller v. Gottemoller, 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 346 N.E.2d 393 (1976).
46. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(1), 1978 Il. Legis. Serv. 1510 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §
801 et seq.).
47. See note 17, supra, and accompanying text.
48. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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direct approach is not followed in the new Act as there is no explicit
mention of the confidentiality of the family members' expressions.
Instead, the Act defines confidential communication as a communication made by a patient or other person to a therapist, to others,
or in the presence of others, during or in connection with providing
mental health services to the patient." Apparently, the legislature
concluded that a pigeonhole attempt to list those communications
which engender confidentiality, as the past psychiatrist-patient
privilege had done, would only detract from the Act's effectiveness.
Therefore, a functional definition has been provided which renders
confidential communications from anyone when made in furtherance of the mental health care of the patient. The new Act enlarges
the psychiatrist's available resources by allowing him to consult,
.under privilege, the patient's friend, neighbor, employer, fellow
employee, family member 50 or anyone else who may be able to supply the desired information. 51 Additionally, the recent enactment
continues to safeguard the confidentiality of the psychiatric environment where necessary persons5" are present and may have overheard the privileged communication.
Purposeful Communication
The requirement which still restricts the confidentiality of any
communication is that the communication be made during or in
connection with the providing of mental health or developmental
disabilities services." This parallels the previous statute which required the communication to relate to the diagnosis or treatment of
the patient. However, the Act gives a broad, non-exhaustive definition of these services, which includes examination, diagnosis, evalu49. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(1), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1510 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §
801 et seq.).
50. According to the repealed privilege, the psychiatrist was permitted to consult a family
member for supplemental information without endangering the confidentiality of the treatment.
51. Professor Spector has asserted that the repealed psychiatrist-patient privilege had
spread the umbrella of confidentiality to its fullest extent. Spector, Confidential Communication Privileges, 1971 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 117, 125. The Act, by
broadly preserving confidentiality for communications made in contribution to the mental
services, further enlarges this circle of confidentiality.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2(1977) (repealed 1978). The specific enumeration of individuals who preserve the confidentiality under the repealed statute, such as persons under
the supervision of the psychiatrist, is implicitly adopted by the Act.
53. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(1), 1978 I1. Legis. Serv. 1510 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 /2, §
801 et seq.).
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ation, treatment, training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation,
or rehabilitation." One commentator has submitted that requiring
the communication to relate to diagnosis or treatment under the
repealed statute was not a serious restriction because virtually every
communication in psychiatry can be so interpreted . 5" This argument
applies a fortiori under the Act because of the expansive meaning
given to mental health and developmental disabilities services.
Legislative Definition of Therapist and Recipient
Undoubtedly, the impact of the Act turns on the definition of
therapist, because the therapist and the recipient are the principal
figures in a confidential exchange. Consequently, the breadth or
narrowness of the privilege is determined by the scope of the definition. The therapist under the Act specifically includes psychiatrist,
physician, psychologist, social worker, or nurse, who provides mental health or developmental disabilities services." Prior to the Act,
there was considerable question regarding whether a patient could
invoke the psychiatrist-patient privilege when he had undergone
psychiatric treatment with a professional other than a psychiatrist.57
The Act reflects a belief that patients who are treated for psychiatric
matters should be entitled to the privilege, regardless of the title or
occupation of the attendant. This logic is reasonable and practical
in light of the increasing involvement of different professionals in
the field of mental health. Although the occupation of the attendant
may well determine the instruments and resources available for
treatment, the different professionals share a common objective,
improvement of the patient's mental condition. Moreover, each of
the persons within the definition of "therapist" is trained in the
practice of eliciting patient responses which require confidential
treatment. Therefore, it seems equitable to entitle the patient to
invoke the privilege regardless of which practitioner is performing
the psychiatric services.
54. Id. § 2(3). Certainly, the broad definition ascribed to these services is partially explainable by the expansive occupational coverage given to the therapist in section 2(9) of the
Act. Id. § 2(9). In short, the services reflect the different functions provided by the various
professionals.
55. Psychiatrist'sDuty, supra note 17, at 1115.
56. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(9), 1978 IlI. Legis. Serv. 1511 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §
810).
57. The repealed psychiatrist-patient privilege, ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977) (repealed 1978), expressly limited its coverage to one who is in fact a psychiatrist or a person
licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his time to the practice of
psychiatry. Therefore, the privilege was ineffectual unless the attendant was a licensed physician or was reasonably believed to be so qualified.
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The Illinois legislature has incorporated a clause in the Act which
might preserve the confidentiality of a communication made to one
who is not within the class of professionals defined as therapists. In
addition to the designated professions, a therapist may be "any
other person not prohibited by law from providing such services or
from holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably
believes that such person is permitted to do so." ' Although the
wording is somewhat awkward and perplexing, the clause apparently requires two distinct conditions. First, it must not be illegal
for the person to hold himself out as a therapist and it must not be
a violation of law for him to provide such services; second, the
patient must reasonably believe that the person can legally provide
the mental health services. The definition would certainly preclude
the use of the privilege for communications made to a voodoo specialist, but few instances can be so categorically rejected. One might
contend, for instance, that a conversation with a religious leader or
marriage counselor deserves the privilege provided by the Act.9 The
argument would be strengthened if the person had actually performed the services and was not precluded by law from providing
them. This determination of privileged status may evolve into a
question 'regarding the reasonableness of the recipient's belief concerning the legality of the services and the precise nature of the
services rendered. By requiring a finding of reasonableness, the legislature has made the court the final arbiter.
The definition of therapist under the Act appears to offer greater
flexibility to the recipient than existed under the prior psychiatristpatient privilege. Section 5.2 required the therapist to be "a person
licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of
his time to the practice of psychiatry, or a person reasonably believed by the patient to be so qualified." 0 At a minimum, the patient must have reasonably believed that the attendant was a licensed physician. No such requirement inheres under the Act.
Therefore, the reasonableness of the recipient's belief concerning
the services to be rendered and the legality of those services must
be the pivotal issue.
A court desiring to restrict the breadth of this open-ended clause
58. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(9), 1978 I1. Legis. Serv. 1511 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 /2, §
801 et seq.).
59. These individuals would not be within the scope of the repealed psychiatrist-patient
privilege because the patient must reasonably believe that the person is a licensed medical
practitioner. See note 57, supra.
60. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977)(repealed 1978).
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defining the therapist may apply the principle of ejusdem generis"'
to invalidate the privilege in a particular case. The court would use
the rule in conjunction with the reasonableness of the claimant's
belief. Essentially, the maxim of ejusdem generis requires that general words following an enumeration of specific persons or things
must be limited to the same general kind or class as that specifically
enumerated. Thus the marriage- counselor or religious leader might
be excluded from the privilege because these persons do not correspond to the same general classes of professionals which are designated under the therapist definition. The common denominator
among the listed classes is specialization in the fields of medical
science, psychology, or social work. Therefore, it would be reasonable for a court to demand a prerequisite showing that the purported
therapist commands an expertise in these disciplines.
There is a further consideration which may prove significant in
determining the scope of the therapist definition. An appellate court
decision, 2 construing the repealed psychiatrist-patient privilege,
has required a showing of intention or expectation of confidentiality
by the patient in order to sustain the privilege. This ruling should
remain effective because it strikes at the foundation of privilege
law, the expectation of confidentiality. 3 The patient's difficulty in
establishing an expectation of confidentiality may bear directly on
the calling of the person to whom the communication was made and
the purpose for which it was made.4
Holder of the Privilege
The Act grants the right to assert the privilege to both the recipient and the therapist, thus perpetuating a fundamental characteristic which has distinguished the Illinois privilege from those
in other states. Section 10(a) of the Act 5 states that "a recipient,
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1968).
62. Gottemoller v. Gottemoller, 37 Ill.
App. 3d 689, 695, 346 N.E.2d 393, 398 (1967).
63. See MCCORMICK (2d ed.), supra note 11, § 72 at 151-52.
64. For example, a communication made to a psychiatrist in the course of a personnel
screening program would initially appear to be privileged. GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, supra note 20,
at 186. The argument in favor of confidentiality would be supported by the fact that the
psychiatrist is explicitly included within the definition of therapist. The claimant, however,
must intend or expect confidentiality when he makes his disclosures and this would seem
entirely unreasonable in light of the facts. The psychiatrist, in the example, is principally
responsible to the employer and must inform the employer of the individual's mental health.
A court could rightfully attribute knowledge of these facts to the claimant and therefore
disallow the therapist-recipient privilege.
65. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, § 2(9), 1978 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 1511 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,§

810).
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and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, has the
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the
recipient's record or communications." At least one virtue of granting this right to the therapist is that the professional could become
the final protection for a patient who has inadvertently waived the
privilege. 6
A similar problem area remained unaddressed under the previous
statute. It was debatable whether the psychiatrist could prevent
disclosure when the patient had intentionally waived the privilege.
If this situation occurs under the Act, "the court may require that
the therapist, in an in camera hearing, establish that disclosure is
not in the best interest of the recipient.""7 The power to order such
a hearing is reserved to the discretion of the court, although the
provision is silent regarding other alternatives. The Act does not
reveal whether the court could summarily rule in favor of either the
therapist or recipient in the absence of the hearing. The answer may
depend on the availability of other admissible evidence to sufficiently establish the propriety of disclosure.
The in camera hearing provision should considerably improve the
recipient's confidentiality in the judicial proceedings. With no legislative restraint, courts under the prior privilege were free to assess
the controversial disclosures in public courtrooms. Implementation
of the in camera hearing when the therapist asserts the privilege
over the patient's objection should temporarily limit disclosure to
the individuals privy to the litigation.
In the event the therapist asserts the privilege contrary to the
wish of the recipient, the Act places the burden of justifying confidentiality on the therapist.6 8 To satisfy this burden, the therapist
must cogently establish that disclosure is not in the recipient's best
interests. The quantum of proof necessary to make this showing
may depend on several factors. The court's willingness to tolerate
infringement of the patient's right to determine disclosure may be
66. Perhaps the classic example of inadvertent waiver is exemplified in Gottemoller v.
Gottemoller, 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 346 N.E.2d 393 (1976), where the plaintiff was held to have
waived the privilege when she authorized a psychiatrist to furnish defendant's attorney with
a copy of her psychiatric records.
67. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(b), 1978 IIl. Legis. Serv. 1511 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
91 1/,§ 810).
68. Id. The Act is designed to protect the recipient's interest and expectation of confidentiality in the mental health services setting. It follows, therefore, that when the recipient has
chosen to waive this right to confidentiality and the therapist insists on invoking the privilege
on behalf of the recipient, it is incumbent upon the therapist to convincingly demonstrate
the benefit to the recipient from his action.
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of decisive importance. Furthermore, the ultimate decision may be
influenced by the severity of the patient's mental condition. It is
probable that the burden has been met when the patient cannot
comprehend the consequences of disclosure, assuming that the therapist's actions can be reasonably construed to be in the best interest
of the recipient. However, if the patient can establish that he is in
control of his faculties and disclosure would not be particularly selfdamaging, the therapist's burden to prevent disclosure may be insurmountable.
Absent Patient
Another pertinent issue concerns the patient's right to assert the
privilege when he is absent from the forum at the time disclosure is
sought. Proposed Illinois Rule 50611 would have required that privileged matter not be admitted against a holder of the privilege unless
there has been an opportunity to claim the privilege.'" However, in
light of the Illinois Supreme Court's failure to adopt the rule,7 the
matter is now left to the discretion of the courts. Without legislative
guidance, the judge will be required to decide this critical issue
predicated essentially on his perception of the equities. A ruling
favoring admissibility could undermine the legislative goal of protecting the confidentiality of professional communication unless a
compelling reason demands disclosures. Since the Act accentuates
the importance of confidentiality, the patient's right to claim the
privilege should not be subject to the whim of a particular tribunal
when he is absent.

EXCEPTIONS To

THE PRIVILEGE

The intent of the Act is to afford sufficient protection to the
patient, without jeopardizing important state interests. To accomplish this objective, the Act provides an expansive privilege, then
carves numerous exceptions from that privilege when confidentiality must yield. The Act incorporates four broad exceptions7 2 from
the previous psychiatist-patient privilege and includes other fairly
specialized exceptions. 3 Analysis will be limited to those exceptions
69. PROPOSED ILL. R. EvID. 506 (Final Draft).
70. PROPOSED ILL. R. Evin. 506, intended to apply the all recognized privileges in Illinois,
states that "Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible
against the holder of the privilege if the disclosure was (a) compelled erroneously or (b) made
without opportunity to claim the privilege." Id.
71. The Illinois Supreme Court, which appointed the committee to evaluate the Proposed
Illinois Rules of Evidence, decided in February, 1979, to take no action on the rules.
72. See note 3, supra.
73. Those exceptions of the Act which find no parallel exception in the repealed
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which have evolved from the prior statute and those innovative
exceptions which should be invoked most frequently.
psychiatrist-patient statute and have therefore been excluded from the discussion are as
follows:
Section 10.
(a) Except as provided herein, in any civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative
proceeding, or in any proceeding preliminary thereto, a recipient, and a therapist
on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, has the privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent the disclosure of the recipient's record or communications.
(5) Records and communications may be disclosed in a proceeding under the
Probate Act of 1975, approved August 7, 1975, as now or hereafter amended, to
determine a recipient's competency or need for guardianship, provided that the
disclosure is made only with respect to that issue.
(6) Records and communications may be disclosed when such are made during
treatment which the recipient is ordered to undergo to render him fit to stand trial
on a criminal charge, provided that the disclosure is made only with respect to the
issue of fitness to stand trial.
(7) Records and communications of the recipient may be disclosed in any civil
or administrative proceeding involving the validity of or benefits under a life, accident, health or disability insurance policy or certificate, or Health Care Service
Plan Contract, insuring the recipient, but only if and to the extent that the recipient's mental condition, or treatment or services in connection therewith, is a material element of any claim or defense of any party, provided that information sought
or disclosed shall not be redisclosed except in connection with the proceeding in
which disclosure is made.
(8) Records or communications may be disclosed when such are relevant to a
matter in issue in any action brought under this Act and proceedings preliminary
thereto, provided that any information so disclosed shall not be utilized for any
other purpose nor be redisclosed except in connection with such action or preliminary proceedings ...
Section 12.
(a) If the United States Secret Service requests information from the Department
of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities relating to a specific recipient
and the Director of the Department determines that disclosure of such information
may be necessary to protect the life of a person under the protection of the Secret
Service, only the following information may be disclosed: the recipient's name,
address, and age and the date of any admission to or discharge from a Department
facility.
(b) The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities and all
private hospitals are required, as hereafter described in this subsection, to furnish
the Department of Law Enforcement only such information as may be required for
the sole purpose of determining whether an individual who may be or may have
been a patient is disqualified because of that status from receiving or retaining a
Firearm Owner's Identification Card under subsection (e) of Section 8 of "An Act
relating to the acquisition, possession and transfer of firearms and firearm ammunition", approved August 3, 1967, as amended.
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1508,
Art. I, §§ 10(a)(5)-(8), 12(a)-(b), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 91 '/2, § 810, 812.)
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Introducing One's Mental Condition
Section 10(a)(1) of the Act 74 excludes from the privilege those
communications made by a patient, who has introduced his mental
condition or any aspect of services received for the condition as an
element of his claim or defense. The rationale for this exception is
that a person could otherwise rely on his mental condition and
simultaneously deny his adversary pertinent information which
might refute the claim or defense." By extending the exception to
include "any aspect of his services received for such condition,"7
the Act resolves any doubt concerning the scope of this exception.
In the past, the patient could presumably have introduced such
matters as the effects of prescribed medical drugs without incurring
forced disclosure of privileged material. 7 Under the Act, this type
of claim would undoubtedly fall within the exception.
Section 10(a)(1)"5 is confined under the Act to civil and administrative proceedings. In omitting criminal proceedings from its coverage, this exception reflects the general belief that a criminal defendant should be entitled to greater evidentiary protection than a
party to a civil or administrative matter."
Once the patient brings section 10(a)(1) into play by introducing
his mental condition," the Act continues to protect the confidential74. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 /2,§ 810).
75. See Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 126 Ill. App. 2d 144, 151, 261 N.E.2d 533, 536-37
(1970).
76. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 '/2, § 810).
77. This inference seems reasonable since the repealed privilege stated that introduction
of one's mental condition rendered the privilege unavailable, but did not require a similar
outcome when only "collateral" matters were involved.
78. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2 § 810).
79. Federal Rules, supra note 11, at 1330. This commentator has articulated the dilemma
which would confront the individual if the exception were applicable to the criminal defendant:
Allowing the testimony of the psychotherapist of a defendant who raises an insanity defense to criminal charges is somewhat repugnant to the concept of privilege
against self-incrimination. The idea that a defendant in a criminal case must
choose between protecting his confidential communications or asserting an effective
defense is unpalatable.
Id.
80. Testimony by the patient or his witness concerning the privileged communication will
be deemed, under the Act, to be an affirmative introduction of one's mental condition.
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1508,
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ity of the communication on record. This is accomplished by emphatically"' requiring the establishment of certain criteria before the
exception can operate. The court must find, after in camera examination, that the evidence is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, or otherwise clearly admissible.2 The court
must also determine that other evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory. Finally, in language echoing Wigmore's fourth criterion,":
the court must find that the interests of substantial justice sought
to be achieved by disclosure are more compelling than the protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship achieved
through the privilege. 4 Again, the Act relies on the in camera procedure,"' which should ensure confidentiality while the court evaluates
the evidence.
The enumeration of these mandatory considerations exemplifies
the legislature's high regard for confidentiality in the field of mental
health. This concern is expressed by the restrictions placed on the
scope of disclosed material under the section 10(a)(1) exception.
Upon satisfying the required criteria, 8 disclosure is limited to the
existence of treatment, the cost of services, and the ultimate diagnosis."' This restriction can only be overridden when the trial court
determines that there is a compelling need for the production of the
communication, thus allowing disclosure of verbatim conversation."
A further restriction on the "Introducing the Mental State" exception has been incorporated in the Act.89 The Tylitzki doctrine"'°
Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91
'/2 § 810). Unlike the repealed statute, which had implicitly excluded the testimony of a
witness on behalf of the recipient, the Act properly closes a gaping loophole to the exception.
81. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 '/2 § 810). The Act permits disclosure "if and only to the extent" that the enumerated
considerations have been satisfied. Id.
82. Id.
83. See note 9, supra, and accompanying text.
84. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(9), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2 § 810).
85. The in camera hearing is recommended when the therapist asserts the privilege contrary to the express wish of the recipient. Id. § 10(b).
86. See notes 81-84, supra, and accompanying text.
87. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(1), 1978 Il1. Legis. Serv. 1513 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 91 '/2, § 810).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 126 Ill. App. 2d 144, 261 N.E.2d 533 (1970).
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states that a claim for pain and suffering shall not be deemed to be
the introduction of one's mental condition." According to the
Tylitzki decison the psychiatrist-patient privilege is too important
to be swept aside when the patient's mental condition is no more
than peripherally involved."
Limits of Disclosure After the Recipient's Death
Another exception retained but modified from the prior
psychiatrist-patient privilege concerns disclosure after the recipient's death. The privilege is waived when the recipient's physical or
mental condition has been introduced as an element of a claim or
defense after the recipient's death.93 This introduction may be by
any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the
recipient. The modification is the extension to the introduction of
physical condition, an element absent from the repealed statute. To
ensure that the recipient's confidentiality is not needlessly violated,
this exception reiterates the required preconditions which govern
disclosure under section 10(a)(1) of the Act. 4 Thus, the Act withholds the privilege when a beneficiary under the recipient's will or
an heir of the recipient introduces the patient's mental condition as
an element of his claim.
Apparently, the introduction of evidence relating the recipient's
physical condition could also occasion disclosure of communications
or records. At initial glance, it seems ironic that the involvement of
the physical condition should precipitate disclosure of all mental
health records. However, the Act deals with this potential inconsistency by conditioning this disclosure on a finding that the evidence
is relevant, probative and that other satisfactory evidence is not
available. 5 These considerations should obviate any potential abuse
which this aspect of the Act might have produced.
Recipient Against Therapist
Section 10(a)(3) of the Act negates the privilege when a patient"J
91. Id. at 149, 261 N.E.2d at 535-36. citing with approval Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc.,
73 I1. App. 2d 405, 219 N.E.2d 165 (1966).
92. Tylitzki v. Triple X Serv., Inc., 126 11. App. 2d 144, 149, 261 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1970).
93. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(2), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1514 (West) (to be codified in ILL. Rav. STAT.
ch. 91 /2, § 810).
94. See notes 82-84, supra, and accompanying text. The language of § 10(a)(1) of the Act,
"not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory," has been omitted from § 10(a)(2).
95. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(2), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1514 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 /2, § 810).
96. This includes the patient's beneficiary following his death. Id. 10(a)(3).
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proceeds against the therapist for injury caused in the course of
providing mental health services. The need for the exception arises
because the Act grants the privilege to the recipient and the therapist, even though the latter is intended to exercise the privilege on
behalf of the recipient. 7 Thus, this exception appears to have been
enacted to ensure that the therapist is able to fully defend himself
against civil suits. The Act permits the therapist and other persons
challenged to disclose pertinent records and communications to an
attorney engaged to render advice or to provide representation in
the matter.
However, the Act leaves one aspect of this problem unresolved.
When a patient sues the psychiatrist and wishes to present evidence
concerning their confidential communication, it would seem possible for the psychiatrist to block disclosure by asserting his independent privilege." Yet, such an extension of the privilege seems unreasonable, as the privilege has been enacted to protect the confidentiality of the patient. Although the exception provides no direct
guidance to resolve this apparent inconsistency, the Act addresses
this conflict elsewhere. Section 10(b)9 9 declares that when the therapist asserts the privilege on behalf of a recipient, but contrary to the
express wish of the recipient, the court may require the therapist to
establish that disclosure is not in the best interest of the recipient.
In order to effectuate the obvious intent'0 0 of the legislature, the
court should refuse the asserted privilege in a malpractice proceeding initiated by the recipient. This is warranted because the patient
has chosen to divulge his confidences, thus rendering the legislative
policy of protecting the patient inapplicable. Injustices would inure
to a patient if his psychiatrist could routinely defeat these claims
by invoking the privilege.
The Court-Appointed Therapist
According to section 10 (a)(4)101 therapist-recipient communications are not privileged when made in the course of a court-ordered
examination. This exception is conditioned on prior notice of non97.

Id. 10(a).

98. See note 97, supra, and accompanying text.
99. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(b), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
91 1/2,§ 810).
100. The legislature seems to contemplate a protected "right" of the recipient to voluntarily waive the privilege evidenced by a difficult burden on the therapist when the latter asserts
the privilege to bar disclosure contrary to the recipient's wish.
101. Id. § 10(a)(4).
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confidentiality being presented to the patient."'2 In People v.
English, 3 the Illinois Supreme Court had indicated that a similar
exception in the repealed privilege statute was unnecessary, because
under the circumstances the patient did not consult the psychiatrist
for the purpose of securing mental health services.' 4 The Act incorporates this exception in spite of the supreme court decision.
In an effort to safeguard the interests of the patient, two restrictions are imposed on the employment of this exception. First, the
court must find that the recipient has been adequately and effectively informed regarding the non-confidentiality of the communication.'0 5 Second, the discourse is admissible only regarding issues
involving the recipient's physical or mental condition, and then only
to the extent that it is germane to the proceeding.'0 The repealed
statute did not specify precisely who must inform the patient that
the communication was not confidential, but presumably any reliable source would have sufficed. Under the Act, the court must be
convinced that the patient has bee been informed as adequately and
effectively as possible, thus restricting the potential field of informants. This restriction is important because the psychiatric patient
may not fully comprehend the degree of incrimination his revelations may cause.' 7
The second limitation regarding confining disclosure to issues involving the recipient's physical or mental condition, has generated
considerable activity in Illinois courts. An example, where the Illinois Supreme Court had to determine whether to allow testimony
by psychiatrists concerning a defendant's incriminating statements
is People v. Williams. 01 The defendant, convicted of murder by the
lower court, had undergone pre-trial examination by two psychiatrists in order to evaluate his competency to stand trial."'" The court
102. Id.
103. 31 Il. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d 455 (1964).
104. Id. at 306-07, 201 N.E.2d at 459. Accord, People v. Lowe, 109 Ill. App. 2d 236, 239,
248 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1969). See also GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, supra note 20, at 187.
105. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(4), 1978 I1. Legis. Serv. 1514 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 91 '/2, § 810).
106. Id.
107. FederalRules, supra note 11, at 1329. In People v. English, 31111. 2d 301, 201 N.E.2d
455 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
entirely applicable in the court-ordered psychiatric examination. Therefore, the patient need
not answer any questions which would incriminate him. Accord, People v. Ehrler, 114 Il1.
App. 2d 171, 252 N.E.2d 227 (1969). By sufficiently informing the patient, the individual
should be cautious to divulge only necessary information.
108. 38 I1. 2d 115, 230 N.E.2d 224 (1967).
109. The psychiatrist had been appointed by the court under the competency hearing
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affirmed the decision of the trial court which had permitted the
psychiatrists to testify, but restricted the testimony to the issue of
the defendant's mental condition. The Act embodies the Williams
restriction when it limits disclosure to matters involving the recipient's mental or physical condition. The application of the Williams
principle makes any statements admissible which contribute information concerning the physical or mental condition of the recipient,
regardless of their incriminating nature."" This can often cause extreme prejudice to the party involved, as under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act."'
Since good cause must be shown before subjecting the recipient
to the court-ordered examination,"' the. patient is protected from
undue prejudice. A similar prerequisite was not incorporated in the
repealed psychiatrist-patient privilege. This additional protection
should preclude a court-ordered examination sought by a prosecutor
or party on dubious criminal or civil charges, with the underlying
hope of obtaining crucial admissions or other incriminating information. At a minimum, the requirement of good cause should focus
the court's attention on the basis for the examination, which on
reconsideration may be found insufficient.
The Civil Commitment Exception
Section 11 of the Act" 3 preserves the civil commitment" 4 exception of the repealed statute and further provides three additional
instances where disclosure may be justified. In addition to civil
commitment proceedings, disclosure is permitted in accordance
with provisions of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act."05
Disclosure is also allowed when the therapist determines that discloprovision, Code of Criminal Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-1 to 3 (repealed 1973,
current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 to 4 (1977)).
110. However, the patient cannot be compelled to make incriminating statements during
the court-ordered psychiatric examination. See note 107 supra.
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-4 (1977).
112. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 10(a)(4), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1514 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 91 /2, § 810).

113. Id. § 11.
114. The civil commitment proceeding is entirely distinct from the provisions of the
Probate Act which authorize appointment of a guardian for a legally disabled person who has
been declared unable to manage his estate or financial affairs. Probate Act, Pub. Act No. 801415, § lla-1 to 23, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1058 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, § 11a-1 to 23). Note, however, that mental illness or developmental disability are

within the class of mental deficiencies which trigger the new guardianship statute. Id. § 1la2.
115.

ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 23, § 2051-2061 (1977).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 10

sure is necessary to initiate or continue civil commitment, or to
protect the recipient or other person against imminent serious physical or mental injury, disease or death, or to protect the recipient
from self-inflicted harm. '8 Finally, disclosure is permitted when the
therapist determines that disclosure is necessary for the provision
of the emergency medical care to a recipient who is unable to assert
his right to such care, where no relative or other third party is
available to give consent."'
Prior to the Act, the provisions of the Abused and Neglected Child
Reporting Act' 9 were grounds for disclosure of material otherwise
protected by the physician-patient privilege,"' but not material protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege.21 Several factors could
explain the legislature's incorporation of this additional exception
into the Act. The general scheme of the Act is to treat various
professionals on an equal basis, making exceptions applicable to all
individuals.' 2 Furthermore, the legislature may have been unable
to sufficiently justify the disparate treatment given physicians and
psychiatrists. However, it is indeed possible that the exception has
been included in the Act to further combat the increasing social
22
problem regarding abused and neglected children.'
An attitude which pervades section 11 of the Act'2 3 is the legislature's deference to the competency, knowledge, and judgement of
the therapist. Giving substance to this notion, the Act permits disclosure when the therapist, in his sole discretion, determines that
it is necessary to initiate or continue civil commitment proceedings
or to protect the recipient or another. 2 The therapist's sophisticated training should make him acutely aware of the symptoms
which accompany suicidal, violent, or other types of dangerous behavior. Therefore, once the therapist has detected this behavior,
116. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 11, 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91

V2,§ 811).
117. Id.
118. IL.. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2051-2061 (1977).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1(7) (1977) (amended by Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1508, Art. II, § 5.1, 1978 Il1. Legis. Serv.
1510 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1).
120. ILL.. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1977)(repealed 1978).
121. See notes 56 and 57, supra, and accompanying text.
122. Illinois Legislative Review, The ChildAbuse Epidemic: Illinois'LegislativeResponse
and Some Further Suggestions, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 403.
123. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 11, 1978 I1l. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91
,/2, § 811).
124. Id. § 11(ii).
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section 11 permits disclosure to the extent that it can be of benefit
in preventing foreseeable harm to the recipient or another. The Act
appears to support the use of the disclosure for any lawful means
which the therapist may employ to avert imminent harm. 25 This is
a radical departure from the previous privilege statute, which restricted disclosure in these matters to civil commitment proceed26
ings.
Section 11(iii) of the Act allows disclosure when, in the sole discretion of the therapist, it is necessary to provide emergency medical care' 27 to a recipient who is unable to assert his rights to such
treatment.' 2 This power arises only when there is no other legallyqualified person available to give consent.' 21 The plain import of this
exception is to make the preferences of the recipient regarding emergency medical care available to the necessary medical personnel. It
may also help reveal those idiosyncrasies or sensitivities which
would make particular medical treatment unadvisable. To the extent that disclosure can clarify the recipient's preferences or sensitivities, the therapist may release the information. The framing of
the exception in terms of emergency medical care indicates that the
legislature recognized the potential for abuse and sought to prohibit
disclosure in instances of routine medical care.
HospitalizationProceedings
Commitment proceedings, which determine whether a patient
must undergo involuntary hospitalization, necessitate a relaxation
of the privilege.' 3 The hospitalization exception"' applies only to
commitment proceedings, thus, the privilege resumes once a patient
125. This seems a likely inference because the exception permits disclosure when the
therapist endeavors "to otherwise protect the recipient." Id.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2(a) (1977) (repealed 1978).
127. The Act, by adopting the language "emergency medical care," implicitly extends to
treatment for physical and mental problems. Under the repealed statute, the only medicallyrelated exception was for hospitalization.
128. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 11(iii), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT., ch.
91 '1,

§ 811).

129. Id.
130. Other states have relaxed the privilege in order to facilitate the commitment proceeding. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. ANN. § 52-146(f)(b) (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §
421.215(3)(a) (1972); N.M.R. Evm. 504(d)(1) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-112(3) (Supp.

1978). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503(4)(a) (West Supp. 1979) (psychotherapist privilege);
ME. R. Ev1D. 504(e)(1) (West Supp. 1978) (physician and psychotherapist privilege).
131. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § 1l(iv), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91
/_,, § 811).
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is hospitalized.'3 2 The state interest in properly and fairly arriving
at an order of commitment necessitates setting aside the privilege
in order to furnish a court with all relevant information. The patient's freedom depends on the outcome of this difficult decisionmaking process. The operation of the exception is most important
in the case of a marginally disturbed individual. There, the previously unavailable testimony may enable a court to make a more3
informed determination in a case clearly lacking in absolutes.' 1
Disclosure under the hospitalization exception will not always work
to the detriment of the patient.' 34 If a frivolous or unsupported commitment suit has been brought against the patient,'35 disclosure of
the communication may persuade the court that the suit is unfounded.
The Act maintains further safeguards within the hospitalization
exception. Although the commitment proceeding is a civil matter,131
the proponent must still establish his claim with convincing evidence. Furthermore, the Act restricts disclosure to the commitment
proceeding itself. This contrasts with the repealed statute, which
only confined the admissibility of the communications "to issues
relating to the need for such hospitalization.' 37 Finally, disclosure
under the Act is furnished to the State's Attorney,' 3 and the Act
132. GOLDSTEIN & KATZ, supra note 20, at 186.
133. Such a situation is present under the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code, which authorizes involuntary hospitalization under prescribed circumstances. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, Pub. Act No. 80-1414, 1978 I1.
§ 1-100 to 128). The Act
Legis. Serv. 1009 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 1/2,
provides the following grounds for commitment: involuntary commitment may be imposed
for a person dangerous to himself or to others, as well as for one unable to cope with everyday
problems and hazards or provide for his basic needs. Id. § 1-119. Without precise guidelines
to follow, the court possesses considerable latitude when applying the Code's standard on a
case-by-case basis. The breadth of the Code's provision, coupled with the hospitalization
exception to the privilege, may operate to improperly commit patients.
134. See Psychiatrist'sDuty, supra note 17, at 1113; Fleming & Maximov, The Patient
or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1039-40; GOLDSTEIN & KATZ,
supra note 20, at 188. These authors assert that the patient would often regret the infliction
of serious harm in calmer periods and the patient's initiation of psychiatric treatment
indicates he desires help in controlling his impulses. See also Arons, Working in the "Cuckoo's
Nest": An Essay on Recent Changesin Mental Health Law and the ChangingRole of Psychiatrists in Relation to Patient and Society, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 73, 80 n.24 (1977).
135. The involuntary commitment proceeding has general standards which should move
the court to dismiss unsubstantiated suits for commitment. See note 133, supra.
136. People v. Chambers, 36 111. App. 3d 838, 345 N.E.2d 119 (1976); Beis, Civil Commitment: Rights of the Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and Trends, 23 DEPAUL L. REV.
42 (1973).
137. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.2(a) (1977) (repealed 1978).
138. Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, Pub. Act No. 801508, Art. I, § l1(iv), 1978 Ill. Legis. Serv. 1515 (West) (to be codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
91 /, § 811).
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prohibits the State's Attorney from utilizing this information for
any purpose other than the commitment proceeding."'
The hospitalization exception presents some potentially adverse
effects on the therapist-recipient relationship. The draftsmen of
proposed federal rule 504,110 which includes a similar hospitalization
provision, justify the exception by asserting that damage to the
professional relationship of the individual parties is unlikely since
"control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a person
in whom the patient has already manifested confidence."'' To the
extent this argument is satisfactory, the reasoning fails to deal with
the possible discouragement of future relationships. 4 ' It is indeed
possible that many patients will view the therapist's disclosure,
even in these limited circumstances, as a betrayal of the professional confidence.'
The Illinois legislature should recognize this
risk. Nevertheless, with the potential for improper commitment
decisions in mind, the hospitalization exception seems to be justified. In the long run, it would appear to act as an important safeguard to due process in commitment proceedings.'
WAIVER

The doctrine of waiver, which according to the Illinois courts
prohibits a holder of a privilege from relying on the privilege once
he has made or directed the voluntary disclosure of the communication,' should apply with equal force and effect to the provisions
139. Id.
140. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504 (psychotherapist-patient privilege) has been formally
rejected by Congress.
141. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 504(d)(1), Advisory Comm. Notes (Preliminary Draft 1969),
cited in Federal Rules, supra note 11, at 1328.
142. See Federal Rules, supra note 11, at 1326.
143. Several commentators submit, on the other hand, that the patient may appreciate
the therapist's efforts to control the patient's impulses. See note 134, supra.
144. One commentator favored the hospitalization exception, even after articulating the
potential detrimental ramifications. The writer favors the exception "since the possible harm
to society and the patient himself present significant dangers which warrant disclosure."
Federal Rules, supra note 11, at 1328. In a related matter note that due process safeguards
have been strengthened in the area of guardianship under the new Illinois Probate Act. See
note 114, supra.
145. See, e.g., People v. Newberry, 53 Il.2d 228, 290 N.E.2d 592 (1972) (defendant, who
called psychiatrist to testify and elicited answers which required substantial reiteration of
defendant's communication, waived privilege); Gottemoller v. Gottemoller, 37 Ill.
App. 3d
689, 346 N.E.2d 393 (1976) (privilege waived when plaintiff authorized psychiatrist to furnish
defendant's attorney with a copy of her psychiatric records); People v. White, 131 II. App.
2d 652, 264 N.E.2d 228 (1970) (defendant waived privilege when he failed to object to testimonial disclosure); People v. Givans, 83 Il. App. 2d 423, 228 N.E.2d 123 (1967) (defendant
waived privilege when he called his own psychiatrist to testify, and could not prevent state's
psychiatrist from testifying).
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regarding the therapist-recipient privilege, the Act provides no specific exemption from the common law rules governing waiver of
evidentiary privileges. The most common example of waiver is by
consensual disclosure of the privileged information. '" This form of
waiver is exemplified in Gottemoller v. Gottemoller,'" where the
patient waived the priv'ilege because she released her psychiatric
record to the opposing party's attorney.'4 8 As a further requirement,
Illinois courts have tacitly required a showing of substantial or significant disclosure before a finding of waiver."' Similarly, in People
v. White,'10 the court held that the failure to object at trial to the
disclosure of privileged communication would constitute waiver. In
a related case, People v. Givans,'5 ' the court found that a defendant
had waived the psychiatrist-patient privilege once he had called his
own psychiatrist to testify. Thus, the principle of waiver has been a
fixture in the area of psychiatrist-patient privilege. Nothing in the
Act should drastically affect that result.
CONCLUSION

The Act represents legislative progress in the protection of the
rights of recipients. By broadening the scope of those professionals
covered, the Act presents a unified, consistent approach to the privilege. The privilege is carved with numerous exceptions each reflecting an instance where confidentiality must give way to important
state interests. The exceptions should operate equitably, if the standards and considerations embodied in the Act are adhered to by the
courts. Whether the courts will be willing to accept the "spirit" of
the Act is indeed another question. Much of the Act's purpose
could be circumvented if a great emphasis is placed on prior case
law. To effectuate the intent of the Act it might be necessary to
occasionally disregard a prior decision which adopted a contradictory interpretation of the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Application
of the Act consistent with the legislative intent, albeit contrary to
precedent under the previous statute, will be a positive step towards
effective protection of extremely sensitive communications.
ROBERT HERST
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
N.E.2d

See, e.g., Gottemoller v. Gottemoller, 37 Ill. App. 3d 689, 346 N.E.2d 393 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 695-96, 346 N.E.2d at 397-98.
See note 145, supra.
131 Ill. App. 2d 652, 264 N.E.2d 228 (1970).
83 Ill. App. 2d 423, 228 N.E.2d 123 (1967); cf. People v. Newberry, 53 Il. 2d 228, 290
592 (1972) (allowing psychiatrist's testimony on the issue of guilt).

